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Abstract 
 
This paper studies the influence of entrepreneurial culture among social groups in an 
economy.  The cultural factor determines their occupational preferences.  We develop a  
model in which a concentration factor has been used as a measure of business culture 
determining the occupational choice patterns of otherwise identical social groups.  The 
occupational distribution of individuals from different groups is obtained by comparing 
expected utilities from employment and entrepreneurship.  Based on the labor market 
outcomes the mean income and income variance of different groups is calculated.  
Individuals from groups with greater cultural traits display higher relative risk aversion 
with a high income variance compared to other groups.  We propose a tax- subsidy 
policy and obtain conditions for maximizing social utility.                   
 
JEL Classification:  D81, J23, H24.  
Keywords: Entrepreneurial culture, Self-employment, Risk aversion, Income 
variance, National Income, Tax-subsidy Policy  
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1.  Introduction 
The concept of culture is not only very wide, but it also lends itself to substantial 
complexity to various forms of social and economic institutions.  The vastness 
embedded in understanding what is meant by culture leads to a belief that it is a 
nebulous concept.  This is one of the reasons why culture has been denied its due place 
in most economic analyses of individual or group behavior.  Economic models, in 
particular, avoid the inclusion of cultural factors in explaining market behaviors or 
responses on the ground that culture itself is very imprecise.  However, generally 
speaking, a non-quantifiable exogenous factor often posits significant explanatory 
power behind a host of economic and social phenomena.  In many related work, such 
‘residual element’ has been recognized as a ‘cultural factor’ (for example, Landes, 
1998) and has also been quite useful for comparing differential growth patterns among 
countries or for regions within a country.   
 Difficulties nevertheless remain in incorporating culture into any analysis based 
on ‘methodological individualism’ (Godley, 2001, p.3).  To quote Godley (2001, p. 3), 
“How can culture be specified when it is yet to be satisfactorily defined?  How can it be 
quantified if it remains vague and unclassified?”  Nevertheless, there exists some effort 
in the literature to draw the links between culture and economic growth.1  The present 
study, on the other hand, uses culture as an important factor in individual decision-
making.  Individuals choose their occupational types based on their cultural 
backgrounds.  In fact, there are a number of cultural factors (racial beliefs, religious 
                                                 
1 See for example, Leibenstein (1978), Casson (1991), Casson and Godley (2000).  
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customs etc.) that affect an individual’s decision.  We, however, focus only on an 
individual’s degree of 'business orientation' as a cultural trait derived from her 
affiliation to a respective economic group.  Essentially, this study has two distinct 
purposes.  First, we determine the distribution of workers and self-employed individuals 
across economic groups with varying degrees of business orientations.  Second, we 
propose a tax policy, which maximizes social utility and additionally, reduces inter-
group income disparity.        
   The parallel literature to which we refer shortly, have made allusions to cultural 
(racial) factors as influencing individualistic behaviors.  The principal motivation 
behind this paper is introducing a cultural dimension in models of economic decision-
making at a much more generalized level.  Moreover, historically speaking, individuals 
in many countries were identified in terms of their family businesses, which in most 
cases took the form of low-level self-employment activities.  The butchers, the brewers, 
the carpenters, or the usurers have successfully maintained their family or, in a more 
aggregative sense, community businesses for ages.  We argue that although the initial 
characteristics associated with respective professions have been significantly 
transformed, the initial conditions could still influence the choice of occupation in a 
modern labor market.  However, for relating directly to this phenomenon, we restrict 
our attention to an analysis of group behavior (as against individual-specific behavior) 
influenced by the cultural legacies.   
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  We present a brief introduction to 
the relevant literature in section 2 and a model in section 3.  We propose a tax-subsidy 
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policy in section 4, where the purpose is maximizing a social utility function.  Section 5 
concludes.  
2. Entrepreneurial Culture   
 One snapshot of the late Victorian economic history of Britain shall be quite 
useful as a first step towards identifying economic groups within a country and the 
mutual attitude that they held against each other.  The entrepreneurial decline in Britain 
during this period has been considered the single most controversial episode on the 
relationship between economic behavior and culture.  Britain’s entrepreneurs during 
this period allegedly nurtured anti-industrial cultural values.  There is some consensus 
that Britain’s industrial experience at the turn of the century was dominated by 
‘intellectual stalemate’ (Kirby, 1992). 
A similar phenomenon was observed in a number of other countries.  Notably, 
in post-independence (1947) India, radical changes were observed in the shifting of 
industrial bases within the country.  Between 1914 -22, for example, the eastern part 
with its base in Calcutta harnessed the largest increase in capital investments from 
European, mixed or purely Indian investors.  Towards the end of the first half of the 20th 
century, the transfer of power from British government to the Government of India lead 
many existing European firms to move their businesses back overseas.  Alternatively, 
they sold off their investments and transferred money overseas.  The void in the eastern 
region was quickly filled by businessmen migrating to this region from other parts of 
the country (mostly, Marwaris from Rajasthan, a western province of India).  Gupta 
(1991) explains in detail why the industrial power in the region shifted away from the 
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local entrepreneurs to those migrating from other regions.  Indigenous peoples’ notion 
of occupation types at the time was the following, “ business is bad, that the guy 
running around in a Mercedes-Benz is unquestionably evil.” (Gupta, 1991, p 107).  On 
the other hand, internally migrating minority2 entrepreneurs from other regions revealed 
in an interview conducted by Gupta (1991), that, they have strong desire to participate 
in business activities and outshine others.  This value-centric attitude towards economic 
decision-making can be extensive and entrenched into a whole community over a 
sustained period of time.  Gupta (1991) seeks to find if this attitude led to an era of 
industrial decay in this region.  One of the reasons he cites is that, while this region of 
India, especially the province of West Bengal idealized the intellectual life, other parts 
of India held up other career goals.  It is generally believed that, there is a lot of family 
education in Marwari and Gujarati families (indigenous of two western provinces of 
India) in developing entrepreneurship skills.  On the other hand, natives of the eastern 
region promote educational achievements and working class bourgeoisie culture.   
The present study invokes culture as a dominating factor behind choice of 
occupation.  However, most studies on the choice of occupation among individuals have 
so far been based on, (1) differing individual abilities (Lucas, 1978; Calvo and Wellisz, 
1980; Jovanovic, 1982; Brock and Evans, 1986), (2) differing degrees of risk aversion 
(Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979; Kanbur, 1979, JPE, 1989, Boadway et al., 1991, 
                                                 
2 In terms of their native language, say Gujarati, and their cultural distance from locally prevalent mass 
culture.  Note, cultural specifications here, are limited to mass culture and we ignore outliers or different 
cultural enclaves within the mass culture.    
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Newman, 1995),3 (3) capital market imperfections and liquidity constraints (Evans and 
Jovanovic, 1989; Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Boadway, 1998; Ghatak and Jiang, 
2002, etc.).  
Essentially, a simple definition of culture would be ‘shared values and beliefs’ 
(Casson & Godley, 2000, p.2).   This definition allows sufficient maneuvering within 
the social sciences in general.  It fits equally well with the subjectivism that underlies 
the economic theory of rational choice.  We build up a model in which a risk-averse 
individual compares his/her utility in alternative occupations of risky self-employment4 
and risk free employment and chooses the one that yields a greater utility.  This, 
however, is based on her position within the mass of population (normalized to 1 and 
classified by group types) uniformly distributed over a scale of relative risk aversion.  
Thus, the group’s position, rather than an individual’s position is a much more 
dominating factor in this analysis and the distribution of individuals by groups have 
been caused by historical or natural selection or may well have been caused by accident.  
Therefore, an important element of this analysis is that an individual’s cultural (or 
group) identity matters (not individual abilities or individual risk aversion) in the ex-
ante occupational choice.  Stated alternatively, we investigate if occupational choice of 
an individual could be an outcome of her cohesiveness to a particular economic/social 
group, when information on particular economic incentives do not ordinarily flow 
                                                 
3 Some other studies consider identically risk- averse individuals: examples being Appelbaum and Katz, 
1986, Rees and Shah, 1986, Kar, 2004, etc.  
4Self-employment can be defined in a number of ways. Knight (1921), Schumpeter (1934), Kirzner 
(1973), Lucas (1978), and Casson (1982) among others have defined entrepreneurship.  For the 
theoretical model we develop in our study, an entrepreneur or a self- employed individual is a hybrid of 
all possible definitions. 
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across groups.  The source of asymmetry here, is therefore, the existence of group-
specific information that other groups do not ordinarily have access to.   
This cultural or ethnic trait also significantly explains entrepreneurial patterns in 
other countries, although the racial characteristics dominate the group formation.  Hout 
and Rosen (2000) notably, find that among blacks and Hispanics in the US, propensity 
to move into business ventures is lower than whites and Asians.5  Other than that, Bates 
(1995, 1997), Fairlie (1996) find that lower levels of assets, lower probabilities of 
having a self-employed father and less past experience in self-employment largely 
explain low entrepreneurial participation by blacks.6 
Further, with respect to immigrants operating businesses in the USA and other 
industrialized countries, a cultural factor seems to be in operation.  Bonacich and 
Modell (1981) emphasized the presence of ‘thrift and co-operation’ (p.45) based on 
cultural and racial characteristics among Japanese immigrants in the US during the pre-
World War II era, in largely facilitating their business ventures.7  In similar studies 
(Bates, 1997; Borjas, 1987, LaLonde and Topel, 1992; Funkhouser and Trejo, 1995; 
Yuengert, 1995; Light, 1985; Duleep and Regets, 1997), the notion of cultural traits 
observed at the source of immigration is used as crucial information in understanding 
                                                 
5 Even having self-employed fathers do not push sufficient number of black Americans into self-
employment. (Hout and Rosen, 2000).  Many black households are dominated by self-employed mothers, 
which do not affect favorably the choice of self-employment by men (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1996).   
6 We use these empirical observations to capture intra-family features as a cultural element in our model.  
7 Among many other immigrant groups, Korean-American men and women (with similar cultural 
background as Japanese) have self-employment rates of 27.9 and 18.9 percent, respectively (Fairlie, 
1996).  Other groups with varying cultural backgrounds but having high business representations are 
Sweedish, Greeks, Lebanese, etc. Besides, Chinese enclaves form a very special type of business set-up.  
(Godley, 2001). 
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the choice of occupation.  According to this view, entrepreneurial behavior of 
immigrants is molded in the country of origin or by their cultural background.8   
In the model we present next, occupational preferences facing all equally risk-
averse individuals (distributed uniformly over the population) are limited to 
employment and self-employment.  While employment means working for a firm or an 
individual at a given wage rate (wage is exogenous in our model), entrepreneurship/ self 
employment refers to “individuals those earn no wage or salary, but derive their income 
by exercising their profession or business on their own account and/or for their own 
risk” (De Wit, 1993, p. 2). 
  
3. The Model 
There are two groups of natives in a country, A and B.  The total population of 
the country is unity.  The number of individuals belonging to group A is αA, while those 
in group B is αB, such that αA+αB =1. 9  The labor market product of all individuals is x 
and the worker receives a return equivalent to her product.  Individuals are not 
differentiated according to skill types.10  Let Aπ  be the proportion of individuals in 
group A who are employed (as opposed to being self-employed) in equilibrium.  
Therefore, the actual number of group A individuals who are employed is calculated as, 
*AAπα , where is the equilibrium value of*Aπ Aπ .   
                                                 
8Yuengert (1995) estimates a two-sector model of immigrant earnings.  It supports that immigrants from 
countries with larger self-employment sectors display higher self-employment rates in the host country.    
9 We assume that α is exogenously determined. 
10 Introducing skill heterogeneity would complicate the model without providing any additional 
inferences to our ends.  
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Now, if an individual chooses self-employment, there is a fixed premium δ over 
his/her product in the labor market.11  Other than that, let ε  be a random return from 
self-employment.  We assume a uniform distribution for ε , )(εg , for ],[ zz−∈ε .  
Looked at alternatively, δ+x is the mean return to the self-employed, as against x 
earned by individuals who instead choose employment.  
Any such individuals who choose to be self-employed in equilibrium (within or 
outside special groups) face a constant relative risk aversion utility function, 
U=(x+δ+ε) 1-r.  In our model, ‘r’ is the degree of relative risk aversion of an individual.  
Individuals have a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function characterized by a 
measure of relative risk aversion ‘r’ as under Arrow-Pratt (1965) and .  Further, 
individuals are distributed uniformly over a scale of relative risk aversion, which 
implies that r follows a uniform density function.  Let r* be the level of relative risk 
aversion at which an individual is indifferent between employment and self-
employment.  This characterizes the marginal individual who is indifferent between 
employment and self-employment, as long as the expected utility from self-employment 
is equal to the market-clearing wage, x.   Thus, individuals with r>r* choose 
employment, while those with r<r* choose self-employment.
]1,0[∈r
12   Accordingly, the 
equilibrium value of π is determined once r* is determined.  Since the population is 
uniformly distributed over relative risk aversion, *1* r−=π .   This solves for the 
                                                 
11 It may be argued that presence of ''δ would push all individuals to self-employment, as there is a 
positive return from self-employment under all states.  However, if ' 'δ is interpreted as the psychological 
return from autonomy, dominance etc. (see Lazear and Moore, 1984; Sexton and Bowman, 1985, p. 131), 
then the existence of ''δ can be a feature among a group of risk-averse individuals.            
12 This renders the present approach different from other models of self-selection in the labor market.  
The equilibrium is independent of distribution of individuals’ abilities or degree of risk aversion.             
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equilibrium level of employment (conversely, self-employment) for individuals, 
subsequently. 
While the above discussion pertains to the behavior of an individual, the point in 
focus is how the affiliation to a special group influences her choices.  This engenders 
classification of the groups according to the special attributes.        
Let us begin with group A individuals, who do not have the special 
characteristics – the business orientation.  The utility function for self-employed 
individuals in group A is given by,  
ArxU −++= 1)( εδ       (1) 
The expected utility (EUSEA) from self-employment when )(εg  follows a uniform 
distribution, is  
            ∫
−
−++=
Z
Z
r dx
z
EUSE A εεδ 1)(
2
1     (2) 
It follows that the lower the degree of marginal relative risk aversion, the higher the 
expected utility from self-employment, 0)( <
Ar
EUSE
δ
δ   
On the other hand, the utility from employment is given by,  
  U       (3) xx =)(
Comparing the expected utilities from (3) and (4) solves for  [point M in Fig (1)]. 
For group A it shows that all individuals distributed with a relative risk aversion greater 
than the critical rate, (r* > r
*Ar
A*), would be employed, whereas those with r* < rA* 
would be self-employed in equilibrium.   
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Thus within group A, *1* AA r−=π are employed in equilibrium, such that the actual 
number of employed is ** AAA παα = .     
 
EUSE 
               U(x)   
 
 
 
                    
 
 
 
 
 
                                           M                        N                                 U(x) 
         x                                                                                        
                                                                                                     BEUSE
 
 
                                                                                                AEUSE
 
                                                                    *Ar *Br r  
 
Figure 1.  Determination of critical relative risk aversion for group A and B. 
The total income of group A is the sum of earnings from self-employment and wages: 
∫
−
+++−=
Z
Z
AAAA dxz
rxrA εεδαα )(
2
1**)1(*   (4) 
   such that, 
*)(* AA rxA δα +=       (5) 
Next, consider individuals in group B.  They share a cultural or racial trait favorable to 
entrepreneurship.   The individuals in this group receive a higher return from 
entrepreneurship based on this cultural attribute.  Such return increases with the 
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locational (alternatively, cheap and easy flow of information over spatially separated 
members of the group) concentration of their fellow (type B) individuals.13  Locational 
concentration provides easy dissemination of specific information across individuals of 
this group.  It may also be interpreted as a group support in the form of information, 
capital or technical advice made available to the business entrants of this group by 
already existing business establishments.  It may also take the form of easy availability 
of credit.14  Stated alternatively, existence of family members or fellow group members 
with similar business experiences can raise the expected returns for new entrants, as 
long as there is positive externality from sharing the information within the group.  
Denote such return by , where kBKBBy )(α= B is an exogenous constant.15  Clearly, 
smaller the size of this special group, smaller is the return.  On the other hand, if kB is 
low (say, < 1), increasing the group size reduces the return from group affiliation.  Even 
if kB = 0, returns from being in the particular group, however small, is positive.  
Therefore, for a given kB there is an optimum group size which generates positive 
returns from group affiliation.  This is obtained at the point where, 02
2
=
B
B
d
EUSEd
α .   
For group B, let  be the critical degree of relative risk aversion.  Proportion of *Br
                                                 
13 Use of concentration factor is a methodological proposition for measuring impact of business culture 
on choice of occupation.  A different type of group formation may be found in ‘immigrant enclaves’ 
(Borjas, 1986) where location-based cohesiveness plays a crucial role.  In the present paper geographical 
proximity does not have to be crucial as long as information flows smoothly.       
14 Cheap credit may be available to new entrants of the same group owing to the advantage of intra-group 
peer monitoring.  So, larger is the size of group B, greater is the help received by those who are part of 
this group, whether a potential entrepreneur or not.     
15  In reality, the groups have a varying degree of business orientation.  Suppose there are a finite number 
of groups, each with an expected return from business orientation.  It is given by , i=A,B, C….  For 
group A in our case, , while for group B, it is > 0.     
iK
iα
0≈iKiα
 14
population belonging to group B and distributed above the critical level would then be, 
.  *1* BB r−=π *Bπ is the proportion of individuals working in equilibrium since their 
relative risk aversion exceeds the critical level.  As before, the actual number of 
individuals from group B working in equilibrium is ** BBπαβ = .   The number of 
group B individuals self-employed in equilibrium is given by *BBrα .      
εdEUSE
Ar>Br
The critical relative risk aversion for group B is similarly obtained by comparing 
expected utilities from self-employment and employment: the utility from self-
employment being    
BB rK
BxUB
−+++= 1)( εαδ      (6) 
and the expected utility: 
εδαx
z
Z
Z
rK
BB
BB∫
−
−+++= 1}{
2
1            (7) 
On the other hand, utility from employment is: 
xxUB =)(          (8) 
Point N in Fig (1) depicts equilibrium for group B.   
Evidently, owing to the presence of a positive return for group B: 
.   
**
BK
BBy )(α=
The mean income of this group is then, 
∫
−
++++−=
Z
Z
BBBB dyxz
rxrB εεδαα )(
2
1**)1(*    (9) 
A simplification of the above form yields, 
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*])([* B
K
BB rxB Bαδα ++=                (10) 
Based on the above discussion we offer the following proposition. 
Proposition 1:  Individuals affiliated to special economic groups display greater 
relative risk aversion and earn higher average income compared 
to others by virtue of group formation. 
 
4. Tax-Subsidy Policy 
We propose a tax-subsidy policy as in Kanbur (1981).  It follows from section 3 
that although individuals are homogeneous in terms of skill (ability) and risk preference 
their choice of occupation is determined by private information of the group to which 
they belong.  In this particular example, more individuals from group B are represented 
in entrepreneurship/ self-employment compared to that from group A.  From a social 
group’s perspective, this asymmetry in occupational distribution is crucial.  Variation in 
self-employment-to-employment ratio across groups leads to between-group income 
gaps, which cannot be compensated for without access to such group specialties.  
Comparing equations (5) and (10), one can calculate the difference in average incomes 
between group A ( AAA α/*** = ) and B ( )/*** BBB α= . 
**)*(**** B
K
BAB rrrAB Bαδ +−=−   (11) 
Thus B**>A**, since, δ >0, *)*( AB rr − > 0 and > 0.  B**=A** is possible 
only when, , implying everybody is employed under all conditions. 
*B
K
B rBα
0** == AB rr
Individuals from group B, with a higher representation in self-employment thus 
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enjoy a higher average income over individuals from group A.  The policy proposition 
pertains to devising a suitable tax-subsidy policy such that a redistribution of income 
from workers to entrepreneurs maximizes social utility.  Now, whether that reduces 
income gaps between groups depends on the elasticity of relative risk aversion across 
groups to the proposed tax-subsidy policies.   
 The social utility ( ) is defined as the sum of the aggregate utility levels for 
group A and group B, 
Ω
BA σσ +=Ω , where, 
∫
−
−+++−=
Z
Z
r
AAAAA dxZ
rxUr A εεδαασ *1)(
2
1*)(*)1(  
and  ∫
−
−++++−=
Z
Z
rK
BBBBBB dxZ
rxUr BB εεαδαασ *1)(
2
1*)(*)1(  
Rearranging, the pre-tax-subsidy social welfare of the economy is given by, 
]})()[(
*2
*
])()[(
*2
*{
2
1*)*1(
*2*2
*2*2
BBBB
AA
rK
B
rK
B
B
BB
rr
A
AA
BBAA
BA
ZxZx
r
r
ZxZx
r
r
Z
rrx
−−
−−
−++−+++−+
−+−++−+−−=
+=Ω
αδαδα
δδααα
σσ
 (12) 
Suppose, a proportional tax is imposed on workers from both groups and the 
entrepreneurs from both groups are subsidized with the help of the proceeds.  There is 
no collection cost or set-up cost and the budget is balanced.  A proportional tax on wage 
lowers income from x to (1-t)x, t being the tax rate.  On the other hand, a proportional 
subsidy shifts EUSEA (as in fig. 1) and EUSEB to the right, subject to a marginal 
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increase in income by (1+s), where, s is the rate of proportional subsidy.16   
              EUSE 
               U(x)   
 
 
 
                    
 
 
 
 
 
                                           M                        N                                 U(x) 
         x                                                                                              U(x(1-t))  
     x(1-t)                                                                           BEUSE
                                                                                                                    BEEUS ′   
                                                                                                        AEEUS ′     
                                                                                                AEUSE
 
                , r*Ar *Br *A′                        r              *B′ r  
 
Figure 2.  Post tax-subsidy critical relative risk aversion for group A and B. 
Therefore, a proportional tax on workers and proportional subsidy to entrepreneurs 
increases the critical relative risk aversion for both groups A and B.  The new critical 
relative risk aversion points are given by *Ar′ and *Br′ .  Clearly, rate of self-employment 
for both group increases and rate of employment for both group falls and it is 
                                                 
16 There are two important considerations here.  First, if the government taxes workers without 
subsidizing the entrepreneurs, that by itself changes the self-employment-to employment ratio in favor of 
the former.  Second, distribution of subsidy may not be equal across both groups.  There can be various 
combinations between groups in the way subsidy is disbursed.  One group may get a higher proportion, 
while the other group gets less. Alternatively, the tax revenue may be used to set-up business schools or 
business information hubs with greater access for representatives of non-business groups.  Even, 
individuals from non-business groups may get access to cheaper credit from financial institutions as part 
of subsidy package, if not a direct proportional subsidy.   Also, the developing countries with less than 
proportionate (to population growth) job creation rate has experimented with various self-employment 
generation schemes to ease out the unemployment problem, receiving mixed response. 
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determined by equating the post-tax and post-subsidy utilities from employment and 
self-employment for both groups.  For example, individuals from group A now 
compare:   
)1()})(1{(
2
1 1 txdxs
Z
Z
Z
rA −=+++∫
−
′− εεδ  
Similarly, ),,,(* tZxrr BB δ′=′ .  As noted earlier, the objective of the government is to 
choose a tax/subsidy rate, which maximizes social utility.  We assume a fully tax-
financed subsidy scheme, such that the net revenue is zero.  Thus, 
∫ ∫
− −
=++++++−
−+−=
Z
Z
Z
Z
K
BBBAA
BBAA
dxrdxr
Z
s
xrrtT
B 0}])({*})({*[
2
1
*)]1(*)1([
εεαδαεεδα
αα
 
Solving for s, 
]**)*)([(
*)*1(2
1++++
−−=
BK
BBBBAA
BBAA
rrrx
xrrZts αααδ
αα     (13) 
 Accordingly, the post-tax-subsidy utility functions facing group A and group B are 
written as, 
∫
−
−+++′+−′−=′
Z
Z
r
AAAAA dxsZ
rtxUr A εεδαασ *1)})(1{(
2
1*))1((*)1(  
and  ∫
−
−++++′+−′−=′
Z
Z
rK
BBBBBB dxsZ
rtxUr BB εεαδαασ *1)})(1{(
2
1*))1((*)1(  
Thus the post tax-subsidy social utility is, 
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]})()[()1(
*2
*
])()[()1(
*2
*{
2
1*)*1)(1(
*2*2*2
*2*2*2
BBBBB
AAA
rK
B
rK
B
r
B
BB
rrr
A
AA
BBAA
BA
ZxZxs
r
r
ZxZxs
r
r
Z
rrtx
′−′−′−
′−′−′−
−++−++++′−
′+
−+−+++′−
′+′−′−−=
′+′=Ω′
αδαδα
δδααα
σσ
          (14) 
Equations (12) and (14) provide conditions under which social welfare increases.  In 
other words, social welfare increases if, 0>Ω−Ω′ , for a suitable choice of t.   
Thus, 
]})()[(
*2
*
])()[()1(
*2
*{
2
1
]})()[(
*2
*
])()[()1(
*2
*{
2
1
*)}*1(*)*1)(1{(
*2*2
*2*2*2
*2*2
*2*2*2
BBBB
BBBBB
AA
AAA
rK
B
rK
B
B
BB
rK
B
rK
B
r
B
BB
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A
AA
rrr
A
AA
BBAABBAA
ZxZx
r
r
ZxZxs
r
r
Z
ZxZx
r
r
ZxZxs
r
r
Z
rrrrtx
−−
′−′−′−
−−
′−′−′−
−++−+++−−
−++−++++′−
′+
−+−++−−
−+−+++′−
′+
−−−′−′−−=Ω−Ω′
αδαδα
αδαδα
δδα
δδα
αααα
 
          (15) 
In order to find the optimal tax rate, we substitute s from (13) in (15), 
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And obtain t* from 0)( =Ω−Ω′
tδ
δ .  The second-order condition may be verified from 
0)( 2
2
<Ω−Ω′
tδ
δ  
This solves for ),,,,(* BA kZxtt αδ= .  We do not rule out the possibility of multiple 
solutions.  In the event of multiple solutions, the government chooses a particular tax 
rate based on a subsequent objective: t that reduces the income gap between social 
groups.  
 For this, we compare the elasticity of post tax-subsidy critical relative risk 
aversion of group A and B to a small change in t*.  Let us suppose that the government 
wants to reduce the average income gap between group A and B in favor of the former.  
Thus choose a tax rate, such that,          
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In other words, choice of a tax rate is limited to the case where the elasticity of critical 
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relative risk aversion for group A is greater than that of group B.  The tax rate should be 
so chosen that, following a small change in the tax rate individuals in group A reacts 
more compared to those in group B.  As a result, in the post-tax regime a relatively 
higher percentage of individuals from group A would enter the self-employment 
category compared to that from group B.  As self-employment earnings exceed earnings 
from employment, this increases the average income of group A.  Although, the average 
income of group B also increases, the percentage change for this t* is lower than that of 
group A’s.    
Based on the above analysis we offer the following proposition: 
Proposition 2:  A proportional tax-subsidy policy increase social utility and 
reduces inter-group income disparity if the elasticity of relative risk aversion to 
changes in tax rates is greater for individuals in group A. 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
 In this paper, we study the influence of group-based culture on the occupational 
choice of individuals.  Between two groups of individuals, one group nurtures a 
working class culture while the other group has a strong entrepreneurial culture, despite 
similar abilities and risk-preference across groups.  Measuring the impact of culture is 
not easy in an economic context.  The return from cultural traits is captured by the 
individual’s cohesiveness to a group of individuals who have strong entrepreneurial 
acumen.  The return materializes through access to information, or easier access to 
capital, or ideas or market concepts that remain private information for the specific 
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group.  Individuals from a certain group enjoy this benefit compared to individuals 
belonging to the other group.  We show that this enterprising group of individuals 
displays higher critical relative risk aversion and that a larger proportion of the 
population enters business.  The average income accruing to individuals of this group 
exceeds that earned by individuals fro the other group.   
 The inter-group income disparity that results from such occupational choice 
pattern may be corrected by using a suitable tax-subsidy policy.  The tax policy may 
also be used to raise the level of social welfare.   
 The policy implications of this paper are straightforward.  For an 
underrepresented group in business, a subsidy would push a larger proportion of 
individuals to a risky alternative.  The importance of this construct lies not on the fact 
that a tax-subsidy policy increases proportion of entrepreneurs from a group, but that it 
acts as a substitute for a cultural trait and even as a second-best, it may increase social 
welfare.     
An alternative to the direct subsidy scheme could be the establishment of an 
information hub for the disadvantaged group, which may include free counseling or 
business training.  This definitely has other general equilibrium implications for the 
economy that may be compared against the policy proposed here.    
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